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PROPERTY LAW*
Michael H. Terry**
Charles H. Rothenberg***
Gloria L. Freye****
The Supreme Court of Virginia, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Circuit Court of Fairfax
County have decided a number of important property law cases
over the past year. Part I of this article discusses the most signifi-
cant of those cases. Legislation passed by the Virginia General As-
sembly with respect to property is discussed in Part II of this
article.
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Condominiums
In Nido v. Ocean Owners' Council,' the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia was asked to determine whether a condominium association
was liable to a unit owner for damages suffered by the unit owner
due to water leakage from common areas into his unit. The condo-
minium's declaration required the association to repair the com-
mon elements,2 and the condominium's bylaws stated that the
council would not be liable for damage to property caused by water
which may leak or flow from any portion of the common elements.3
The court upheld the waiver of liability contained in the bylaws
and limited the waiver's effect to the specific occurrences set forth
in that section of the bylaws. The court also determined that
* Copyright 1990, authors.
** Shareholder, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.A.,
1978, University of Richmond; J.D., 1982, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Wil-
liam and Mary.
*** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.A.,
1984, State University of New York, College at Oneonta; J.D., 1987, T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
**** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.S.,
1972, Madison College; M.Ed., 1978, James Madison University; J.D., 1988, T.C. Williams
School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. 237 Va. 664, 378 S.E.2d 837 (1989).
2. Id. at 666, 378 S.E.2d at 838.
3. Id. at 667, 378 S.E.2d at 838.
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"[c]ontractually limiting the liability which a group may have to a
member of the group, particularly for consequential damages, is
not against public policy."4
The dispositive question in Rotonda Condominium Unit Owners
Association v. Rotonda Associates5 was whether the unit owners'
association had standing to initiate a suit in 1985 alleging defects
in the common elements where the causes of action accrued prior
to July 1, 1981.6 The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that
the association lacked standing to sue because representative suits
on behalf of condominium owners were not permitted until July 1,
1981, when the Condominium Act was amended by section 55-
79.80(b)(1) of the Code of Virginia (the "Code"). Causes of action
arising prior to that date vested solely in the individual unit own-
ers." The statute effected a substantive change in the law because
it took the individuals' rights and transferred them to the associa-
tion.' As a substantive change, the statute must be applied pro-
spectively affecting only rights which accrue after its effective
date.'" The rights of the individual unit owners did not transfer to
the association because the cause of action accrued prior to July 1,
1981." Therefore, only the individual unit owners themselves had
standing to bring the suit.
B. Contracts
1. Conditions Precedent
In Mann v. Addicott Hills Corp.,12 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that a "sale of existing residence" contingency to a sales
contract containing affirmative obligations to be performed by the
purchasers was a condition for the benefit of both the purchasers
and the seller. 13 The contingency was included at the request of
the purchasers for the sale of their present residence. However, for
4. Id.
5. 238 Va. 85, 380 S.E.2d 876 (1989).
6. Id. at 86, 380 S.E.2d at 877.
7. Id. at 88, 380 S.E.2d at 878.
8. Id. at 88-9, 380 S.E.2d at 878.
9. Id. at 89, 380 S.E.2d at 878-79.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 90, 380 S.E.2d at 879; see Wells v. Lorcom House Condominiums' Council, 237
Va. 247, 254, 377 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1989) (condominium association lacked standing to sue
for damage to common elements prior to amendment to section 55-79.80(bl) of the Code).
12. 238 Va. 262, 384 S.E.2d 81 (1989).
13. Id. at 263, 384 S.E.2d at 82.
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the seller's benefit, the contingency provided that the purchasers
would list their home for sale within a specific period of time, the
purchasers would diligently pursue the sale of their residence, and
that failure to timely list their home or to secure a contract for the
sale of their home would be a default by the purchasers. Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the trial court's decision that the purchas-
ers' breach of their obligations contained in the contingency provi-
sion was material. The seller was entitled to terminate the contract
as a result of the breach, and the purchasers were not entitled to
specific performance. 4
2. Fraud
The trial court's decision to set aside a jury verdict in favor of
the Murrays was affirmed in Murray v. Hadid.1r The Murrays per-
suaded Hadid to become an investor to purchase land upon which
the Murrays wanted to build and develop a townhouse project. 16
Relying upon Hadid's oral assurances that they would be the de-
velopers, the Murrays played a significant role in bringing Hadid
together with the owner of the property and facilitating the sale of
the property to Hadid.17 Hadid subsequently assigned the
purchase contract to a partnership, of which he was a limited part-
ner, and retained a different developer for the project.'
The Murrays sued Hadid alleging that but for Hadid's fraud,
they would have bought and developed the property and reaped
the same profits as Hadid.19 The trial court set aside the jury ver-
dict in favor of the Murrays on two primary grounds: (1) The Mur-
rays' damages were not proximately caused by Hadid's fraud, and
(2) the Murrays' lost profits were too speculative.2 0 The court
unanimously agreed that the Murrays' real estate activities were
illegal.21 A majority of the court agreed that despite the Murrays'
detrimental reliance on Hadid's misrepresentations, the Murrays
failed to prove that actual damages were caused or that they lost
14. Id. at 268-69, 384 S.E.2d at 85.
15. 238 Va. 722, 385 S.E.2d 898 (1989).
16. Id. at 725, 385 S.E.2d at 900-01.
17. Id. at 726, 385 S.E.2d at 901.
18. Id. at 727, 385 S.E.2d at 902.
19. Id. at 728, 385 S.E.2d at 902.
20. Id. A third reason for setting aside the jury verdict was that the Murrays' actions
violated the real estate brokers licensing statutes. Id.
21. Id. at 729, 385 S.E.2d at 903.
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certain prospective profits because of Hadid's fraud.22
3. Installment Sales Contracts
In Daugherty v. Diment,2 s the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
cided whether the free assignability clause of an installment sales
contract conflicted with the "due on sale" clause of a deed of trust
securing payment of the amount due to the seller pursuant to the
installment sales contract.2 4 The court agreed with the trial court
that there was no inconsistency between the two clauses.2 5 The
court concluded that where there are multiple documents in a bus-
iness transaction, they must be construed together as a whole to
ascertain the intent of the parties and that no provision should be
treated as meaningless if any reasonable interpretation consistent
with other provisions in the documents can be ascribed to it.26
When the assignee accepted the assignment of the rights pro-
vided by the installment sales contract, pursuant to an assignment
instrument which referred to the original purchaser-assignee's obli-
gations under the installment sales contract, the assignee became
subject to the obligations of the two deeds of trust on the property,
one of which contained a "due on sale" clause.27 The consistency
between the documents was supported by the intent of the parties:
the original seller extended credit to the original purchaser but re-
tained the right to evaluate the financial abilities of any unknown
assignee and renegotiate the terms of the documents or require full
payment of the note upon the sale of the property.28
4. Option Contracts
In Dominion Bank, N.A. v. Wilson,29 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit determined that for the purposes of a security
22. Id. at 731-32, 385 S.E.2d at 904-05. Justice Stephenson, Chief Justice Carrico and
Justice Thomas dissented, stating that the Murrays' losses were not speculative and re-
sulted from their reliance upon Hadid's misrepresentations. Id. at 734, 385 S.E.2d at 906. In
the dissenting justices' opinion, the jury award for both compensatory and punitive damages
should have been reinstated. Id.
23. 238 Va. 520, 385 S.E.2d 572 (1989).
24. Id. at 522, 385 S.E.2d at 572.
25. Id. at 525-26, 385 S.E.2d at 574-75.
26. Id. at 524, 385 S.E.2d at 574.
27. Id. at 525, 385 S.E.2d at 574.
28. Id. at 526, 385 S.E.2d at 575.
29. 867 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1989).
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agreement, which by its terms encumbered only personal property,
an interest in a real estate option contract constituted real prop-
erty rather than personal property upon exercise of the option.
Virginia law provides that contracts for the purchase of land or the
exercise of an option to purchase land gives the purchaser an equi-
table interest in real estate.30 The court applied this doctrine of
equitable conversion to determine that Wilson's interest in the op-
tion contract, where the option had been exercised, was not subject
to the bank's subsequently acquired security interest in Wilson's
personal property.3 1
In Landa v. Century 21 Simmons & Co.,32 the Supreme Court of
Virginia interpreted language in a real estate sales contract pur-
porting to grant the purchasers a first option to purchase prop-
erty."3 The purchasers closed on a seventy acre tract and by con-
tract had a first option on a remaining tract. Subsequently, the
purchasers learned that the seller had entered into a contract for
the sale of the remaining tract to a third party. The purchasers
instituted suit for breach of the purported option and for specific
performance. s4
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's denial
of specific performance and the trial court's finding that the option
was incomplete and uncertain.35 The court determined that the
contract provision created a first right of refusal, not an option to
purchase. The contract obligated the seller to provide the purchas-
ers with notice of an offer to purchase the property and an oppor-
tunity to elect to purchase the property on the same terms as the
third party offer.36
The court relied on the language of the subject provision and the
conduct of the parties characterizing the provision as a right of
first refusal and not an option. Unlike an option, the language
30. Id. at 205.
31. Id. at 206.
32. 237 Va. 374, 377 S.E.2d 416 (1989).
33. Id. at 378, 377 S.E.2d at 418.
34. Id. at 380, 377 S.E.2d at 419.
A right of first refusal is distinguished from an absolute option in that the former
does not entitle the [buyer] to compel an unwilling owner to sell. Instead it requires
the owner, when and if he decides to sell, to offer the property first to the person
entitled to the right of first refusal.
Cities Serv. v. Estes, 208 Va. 44, 47, 155 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1967).
35. Id. at 383, 377 S.E.2d at 421; see Daugherty, 238 Va. 520, 385 S.E.2d 572 (1989).
36. Landa, 237 Va. at 382, 377 S.E.2d at 420.
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clearly did not commit the seller to sell the property. Also, notice
was required to run from the seller to the purchasers. Normally,
where an option has been granted, notice is required to run from
the purchasers to the seller.17
The conduct of the parties also indicated that the provision cre-
ated a right of first refusal for the benefit of the purchasers. For
instance, when the purchasers initially filed suit, the seller sent a
letter giving the purchasers an opportunity to elect to purchase the
property under the same terms as contained in the third party's
offer. Also, the seller provided the purchasers with a copy of the
third party's contract as requested by the purchasers.3
5. Rescission
The Fairfax County Circuit Court case of Frank v. Tipco Homes,
Inc.3 9 has sent Virginia real estate attorneys scurrying to revise
their contract forms. Frank entered a contract to buy a lot upon
which Tipco Homes was to build a house. No closing was ever held
on the subject property. The circuit court, applying section 11-2.3
of the Code, held that the contract was voidable at the buyer's op-
tion because the contract did not require completed performance
within two years from the date of execution. °
Bergmueller v. Minnick41 involved a suit brought in equity by
the Bergmuellers praying for rescission of a contract for the sale of
37. Id.
38. Id. at 379, 377 S.E.2d at 419.
39. No. 94415 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct. April 16, 1990).
40. Contracts made on and after July 1, 1977, for the sale of improved residential real
estate which do not require completed performance within two years from the date of
execution of the contract, shall be voidable at the option of the buyer unless such
contract shall be (i) in such form as to be capable of being admitted to record under
the provisions of Chapter 6 (§ 55-106 et seq.) of Title 55 of the Code of Virginia; (ii)
made in duplicate and a copy capable of being admitted to record furnished to the
buyer; and (iii) contain the following statement: "This contract must be recorded in
the general index of the clerk's office of the circuit court of (city or
county in which land is located) in order to protect the buyer from claims of subse-
quent purchasers of, or other persons obtaining an interest in, this real estate or
claims of judgment creditors, if any, of the seller." The term "improved real estate"
shall be deemed to include any land within a subdivision, a plat of which subdivision
has been recorded pursuant to Article 7 (§ 15.1 - 465 et seq.) of Chapter 11 of Title
15.1 or prior statutory authority.
Va. Code Ann. § 11-2.3 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
41. 238 Va. 332, 383 S.E.2d 722 (1989).
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land based on an allegation of constructive fraud. In 1989, the
Bergmuellers contracted to purchase land for a retirement home
contingent upon satisfactory results from a percolation test to be
performed prior to closing. The Bergmuellers, who resided out of
state, proceeded to close relying upon the seller's real estate
agent's representation that the percolation test had been per-
formed and was satisfactory.42
No percolation test was ever performed. Instead, the real estate
agent obtained a limited permit to install a sewage disposal system
for a house of a certain size. The Bergmuellers were never aware
that this permit existed nor that it expired twelve months after
issuance. 43 Three years later, the Bergmuellers moved to Virginia
and learned that a septic system could not be installed and the lot
was not suitable for a residence.44
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the Bergmuel-
lers had established all the elements of constructive fraud by clear
and convincing evidence.45 Furthermore, the Bergmuellers had not
waived their rights to rescind the contract because they had no
knowledge of the true facts, no reason to distrust the assertions of
the real estate agent and no intention of waiving the contractual
provision requiring satisfactory percolation test results.46
6. Parol Evidence
In Anden Group v. Leesburg Joint Venture,47 the Supreme
Court of Virginia was asked to determine whether a trial court
properly admitted parol evidence in reaching its decision to deny
specific performance. The Anden Group ("Anden") entered into
two contracts with Leesburg Joint Venture ("Leesburg") for the
purchase of two adjoining parcels of land. Anden also entered into
an agreement to purchase property from Homet, Inc. ("Homet").
Each contract provided for feasibility periods, security deposits in
different amounts and a separate purchase price for each parcel.
42. Id. at 335, 383 S.E.2d at 723.
43. Id. at 335, 383 S.E.2d at 724.
44. Id. at 336, 383 S.E.2d at 724.
45. Id. at 337, 383 S.E.2d at 724.
46. Id. at 338, 383 S.E.2d at 725. A dissent suggested that the Bergmuellers should have
been estopped from raising the lack of percolation test after neglecting their duty to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the percolation test for three years. Id. at 338-40, 383 S.E.2d at 725-
26 (Whiting J., dissenting).
47. 237 Va. 453, 377 S.E.2d 452 (1989).
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Anden defaulted under the second contract with Leesburg and ac-
knowledged that it forfeited its deposit as liquidated damages.
Leesburg and Homet refused to close on the other two contracts
claiming that the contracts were interdependent. Anden sued for
specific performance or, alternatively, damages.48
The trial court ruled that the contracts constituted one unitary
contract. In reaching this decision the trial court ascertained the
parties' intent from various letter agreements between the par-
ties.49 For example, the trial court relied on parol evidence that the
reduction in the purchase price on one contract was acceptable to
Leesburg because Leesburg had "negotiating room" under its other
contract with Anden and Anden was obligated to purchase all
three parcels.50
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the parol evi-
dence rule prohibited the introduction of the evidence relied on by
the trial court."' The parol evidence relied on by the trial court did
not merely clarify ambiguous terms; the parol evidence contra-
dicted the written document.5 2 The reduction in the purchase price
clearly applied to only one of the three contracts. Also, nothing in
the contracts provided that settlement under one contract was a
condition to settlement under the other contracts. In addition, the
correspondence between the parties referred to the documents as
separate and distinct "contracts" and treated Leesburg and Hornet
as separate entities. The court also noted that neither of the two
sellers acting alone could effectively transfer all three parcels pur-
suant to the sales contracts. This evidence supported the court's
conclusion that three separate contracts existed.5
7. Specific Performance
The sole issue considered by the court in Hinkell v. Adams 54 was
whether the seller under a contract of sale was entitled to specific
performance after the purchaser allegedly breached the contract of
48. Id. at 455, 377 S.E.2d at 454.
49. Id. at 457-58, 377 S.E.2d at 454-56.
50. Id.; cf. Landa v. Century 21 Simmons & Co., 237 Va. 374, 377 S.E.2d 416 (1989) (per-
mitting parol evidence which clarified ambiguous terms of contract).
51. Anden Group, 237 Va. at 459, 377 S.E.2d at 456.
52. Id. at 458, 377 S.E.2d at 456.
53. Id. at 459, 377 S.E.2d at 456.
54. 237 Va. 635, 378 S.E.2d 621 (1989).
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sale.55 The purchaser contracted to purchase a thirty acre parcel of
land from the seller. The contract required closing to occur on Sep-
tember 30, 1984, or as soon thereafter as financing could be ar-
ranged. The purchaser notified the seller that he was unable to ob-
tain financing for the property and would be unable to settle.5"
After the seller brought suit for specific performance, he recorded
a subdivision plat affecting the thirty acre parcel.51
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the seller was not enti-
tled to specific performance. The seller was unable to perform
under the contract because of the recordation of the subdivision
plat and its effect on the thirty acre parcel which was to be con-
veyed. The subdivision plat imposed easements on the parcel, in
addition to setback lines and new lot lines, inconsistent with the
original boundaries of the thirty acre parcel.58 The court deter-
mined that the seller's recordation of the subdivision plat evi-
denced the seller's intent to abandon the contract."
In Shepherd v. Colton, ° the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered whether the purchaser in a written contract for the purchase
of real property was entitled to specific performance. Pursuant to a
written contract, Shepherd agreed to purchase from the sellers Lot
B in a proposed subdivision in Fairfax County. The instrument
also granted Shepherd an option to purchase Lot A in the pro-
posed subdivision. County approval of the proposed subdivision
was a condition precedent to the sellers' obligation under the con-
tract.61 The county denied the subdivision request for Lot A but
indicated that a subdivision including Lot B would be possible.
However, the sellers refused to convey either lot and claimed that
the contract was void. 6
2
The court determined that the sellers' obligations to sell Lot A
and Lot B were divisible. The contract set forth separate purchase
prices for the two lots. Lot B was the subject of an agreement to
sell and Lot A was the subject of an option granted to Shepherd.6 3
55. Id.
56. Id. at 636, 378 S.E.2d at 621.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 636-37, 378 S.E.2d at 621-22.
59. Id. at 638, 378 S.E.2d at 622.
60. 237 Va. 537, 378 S.E.2d 828 (1989).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 539, 378 S.E.2d at 829.
63. Id. at 540-41, 378 S.E.2d at 830; compare Anden Group v. Leesburg Joint Venture,
237 Va. 453, 457-58, 377 S.E.2d 452, 454-56 (1989) (intent of parties implied from writings)
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Because the sellers could have obtained subdivision approval for
Lot B, the court held that the trial court erred in striking the evi-
dence as to that lot and entering judgment for the sellers4.6 How-
ever, the court held that because the condition precedent relating
to the sale of Lot A (i.e. subdivision approval) was not satisfied,
Shepherd was not entitled to specific performance as to Lot A.65
The Wingate v. Coombs6 6 decision definitely settled whether an
oral partnership agreement to acquire and develop real property
for profit is rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds. Win-
gate and Bremner entered into an oral partnership agreement with
four other individuals (the defendants) for the purpose of acquir-
ing and developing a tract of land. Wingate and Bremner per-
formed services with respect to contracting, acquiring and develop-
ing the tract. The parties agreed to purchase the tract and divide
the profits from the sale thereof equally as partners.6 Prior to the
actual purchase of the tract by the partnership, the defendants no-
tified Wingate and Bremner that Wingate and Bremner were no
longer members of the partnership. Wingate and Bremner sought
to enjoin the defendants from disposing of the tract and obtained a
declaratory judgment confirming the validity of the partnership
agreement.6 8
The court determined that its earlier decisions 9 holding that an
oral partnership agreement with respect to the ownership of land
was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, were overruled, sub
silentio, by Miller v. Ferguson."° In Miller, the court adopted the
majority rule set forth in Wingate on this question, which is that
property acquired for partnership purposes is personalty. 7' Reaf-
firming the rule and applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the
court held that the trial court had erred in concluding that the
agreement was governed by, and therefore invalid under, the stat-
ute of frauds. 72
with Shepherd, 237 Va. 537, 540, 378 S.E.2d 828 (1989) (intent of parties derived from
contractual language).
64. Shepherd, 237 Va. at 541, 378 S.E.2d at 830.
65. Id.
66. 237 Va. 501, 379 S.E.2d 304 (1989).
67. Id. at 503, 379 S.E.2d at 305.
68. Id.
69. Henderson v. Hudson, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 510 (1810); Walker v. Herring, 62 Va (21
Gratt.) 678 (1872).
70. 107 Va. 249, 57 S.E. 649 (1907).
71. Wingate, 237 Va. at 507-08, 379 S.E.2d at 307.
72. Id. at 508, 379 S.E.2d at 307. The statute of frauds provides in pertinent part that no
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C. Deeds
Brown v. Resort Developments3 stemmed from a suit that
sought to have a deed set aside as invalid because the grantor, a
seventy-two year old widow, lacked the mental capacity to under-
stand the nature of the deed she executed. 4 The widow had sold
four parcels of Virginia Beach real estate for a total of $70,000 in
September of 1986.75 In October of 1986, the Department of Social
Services of the City of Virginia Beach petitioned for guardianship
of the widow and in November of 1986, a guardian was appointed.
The guardian sought to have the deed set aside on the basis that
the widow was incompetent at the time she executed the deed.76
The trial court held that the guardian failed to rebut the pre-
sumption that the widow was of sound mind at the time she exe-
cuted the deed.71 The burden was on the guardian to establish that
the grantor, at the time the instrument was executed, did not have
sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the transac-
tion and to agree to its provisions. The Supreme Court of Virginia,
reviewing the record and the commissioner's finding, acknowledged
that the facts surrounding the execution of the deed are dispositive
in determining mental capacity and that the testimony of wit-
nesses present at the time of execution carries greater weight than
those not present.71 Those present at the closing, the grantor's at-
torney, the grantee's attorney and the real estate agent, all testified
that the grantor understood the deed and the transaction which
included the conveyance of her home.79 Therefore, the court af-
firmed the trial court's determination that the deed was valid.80
The case of Gant v. Gants' involved a deed which purported to
convey property to "Junius W. Gant and Helen T. Gant, his wife
...as tenants by the entireties with the right of survivorship as at
action on the sale of real estate may be brought unless the contract, agreement or promise of
sale is in writing and signed by the party to be charged. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(6) (Cum.
Supp. 1990).
73. 238 Va. 527, 385 S.E.2d 575 (1989).
74. Id. at 528, 385 S.E.2d at 576.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 529, 385 S.E.2d at 576.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 530-31, 385 S.E.2d at 577.
80. Id. at 532, 385 S.E.2d at 578.
81. 237 Va. 588, 379 S.E.2d 331 (1989).
1990]
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common law.""2 At the time of the conveyance, Junius and Helen
were divorced and they never remarried. 83 Mr. Gant died intestate
survived by his ex-wife, his widow, and three daughters. 4 The
widow and her daughter sought partition of the property pursuant
to section 20-111 of the Code.5
The court rejected this contention and stated that section 20-111
does not apply to property acquired after a final divorce.8 6 Di-
vorced parties are not precluded from acquiring property as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship. 7 Notwithstanding the par-
ties' attempt to take title as tenants by the entireties, the language
of the deed created a joint tenancy with the express retention of
the right of survivorship.58 Accordingly, the estate passed by survi-
vorship to the ex-wife. 89
The issue presented in Poindexter v. Molton ° was how to deter-
mine the ownership interests of the parties where the property
description in a deed of partition differed from the description in
the simultaneously recorded plats.91 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia employed the fundamental rule that the intent of the parties
is the primary consideration when construing deeds.2 Since the
deed combined with the plats made the deed ambiguous, the court
held that it was proper to consider parol evidence from the tax
maps and from subsequent conveyances in order to resolve the am-
biguity and determine the parties' intent.93
In Williams v. Consolvo, 94 the Supreme Court of Virginia ap-
plied the "general rule that payments made under a mistake of law
82. Id. at 589, 379 S.E.2d at 331.
83. Id. at 589-90, 379 S.E.2d at 331.
84. Id. at 590, 379 S.E.2d at 331.
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1990) provides that:
Upon the entry of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony ... the right of
survivorship in real or personal property title to which is vested in the parties as joint
tenants or as tenants by the entirety, with survivorship as at common law, shall be
extinguished, and such estate by the entirety shall thereupon be converted into a
tenancy in common.
86. Gant, 237 Va. at 590-91, 379 S.E.2d at 332.
87. Id. at 592, 379 S.E.2d at 333.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 593, 379 S.E.2d at 333.
90. 237 Va. 448, 377 S.E.2d 450 (1989).
91. Id. at 449, 377 S.E.2d at 451.
92. Id. at 450, 377 S.E.2d at 452.
93. Id. at 451, 377 S.E.2d at 452.
94. 237 Va. 608, 379 S.E.2d 333 (1989).
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are voluntary and not recoverable. '95 Williams had acquired cer-
tain real property which unbeknownst to him was encumbered by
a deed of trust to secure repayment of a $10,000 note. The deed of
trust had been indexed improperly in the records of the clerk's of-
fice of the circuit court. The defendant law firm retained by Wil-
liams in connection with the acquisition did not discover the deed
of trust during its title search. The clerk properly indexed the deed
of trust approximately six months after Williams acquired the
property.9"
Williams learned of the deed of trust when he received a letter
from counsel for the noteholder which stated payments were in ar-
rears and foreclosure proceedings would be instituted if the debt
remained unpaid. The defendant law firm made several demands
upon the clerk of the circuit court to save Williams and the prop-
erty harmless because the deed of trust had been misindexed.
However, a notice of foreclosure was given. Williams retained a dif-
ferent law firm which negotiated an agreement to repay the out-
standing debt and Williams subsequently made payments on the
debt. Williams filed a two-count motion for judgment against the
clerk for negligence in misindexing the deed of trust, and against
the defendant law firm for negligence.9 7 The defendant law firm
had'not advised Williams of his status as a bona fide purchaser for
value and that any payments made to the noteholder by Williams
would be viewed as voluntary.98 However, Williams made no pay-
ment during the period when he was represented by the defendant
law firm.99
The court concluded that Williams had received legal advice
from a different attorney, was not at risk of losing his property and
could have enjoined the threatened foreclosure proceedings. 100
Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that Williams made vol-
untary payments to the noteholder and these payments could not
be relied upon to prove damages in the suit against the clerk and
the defendant law firm.101
95. Id. at 614, 379 S.E.2d at 336.
96. Id. at 610, 379 S.E.2d at 334.
97. Id. at 612, 379 S.E.2d at 335.
98. Id. at 611, 379 S.E.2d at 335.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 615, 379 S.E.2d at 337.
101. Id. at 616, 379 S.E.2d at 337.
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D. Easements
1. Expansion of Scope of Easement
In Walton v. Holland,0 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that an easement, granted for the benefit of one parcel, could not
be expanded to benefit other properties owned by the grantee of
the parcel because the expanded use would increase the burden on
the servient estate.10 3
2. Easement by Necessity
In American Small Business Investment Co. v. Frenzel,04
American Small Business Investment Company ("ASB") sought to
establish a right-of-way by necessity from its landlocked triangular
piece of Parcel A over Parcel B. 05
The court found that no easement by necessity had been cre-
ated.106 The court said that when the common owner of Parcel A
and Parcel B placed a deed of trust on Parcel A but not on Parcel
B the unity of title to Parcels A and B was severed. 07 To establish
an easement by necessity, the necessity must arise at the time the
common ownership is severed. 0 8 Parcel A did not need a right-of-
way over Parcel B until three years later when the state con-
demned part of Parcel A. As the necessity did not arise at the time
unity of title was severed, ASB failed to establish an easement by
necessity. 0 9
3. Prescriptive Easements
In Callahan v. White,"' the Callahans sought to establish a
right-of-way over land owned by the Whites and to enjoin interfer-
ence with their use of the right-of-way. The Callahans asserted
that the right-of-way ran from State Route 623 over the Whites'
land, continued over another tract of land owned by a third party
102. 238 Va. 687, 385 S.E.2d 609 (1989).
103. Id. at 690, 385 S.E.2d at 610.
104. 238 Va. 453, 383 S.E.2d 731 (1989).
105. Id. at 455, 383 S.E.2d at 733.
106. Id. at 456, 383 S.E.2d 734.
107. Id. at 457, 383 S.E.2d at 734.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 238 Va. 10, 381 S.E.2d 1 (1989).
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and known as the Elmore tract, and then ran to the boundary of
the Callahans' land."' The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
trial court's denial of a prescriptive easement over the Whites' land
primarily because the use of the right-of-way was not exclusive to
the Callahans. 112 The Callahans' use of the right-of-way depended
on the right of the owner of the Elmore tract to use the right-of-
way.11 3
In McNeil v. Kingrey,"4 a case of first impression, the Supreme
Court of Virginia determined whether the owners of the servient
estate or the owners of the dominant estate bear the burden of
proving a change in the use of a prescriptive easement. The court
placed the burden of proof on the party claiming a prescriptive
easement. That party must establish that the claimants' change in
use imposes no additional burden on the servient estate."'
E. Eminent Domain
In Commonwealth Transportation Commission v. DuVal,"6 a
Chesterfield County condemnation case, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia provided guidance on the issue of valuation instructions in
condemnation suits. The court decided that a landowner is not en-
titled to any increase in value which is caused "in whole or in part"
by the project for which the land is condemned." 7
The principal issue considered by the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Bartz v. Board of Supervisors"8 was determining when a taking
occurred. The court rejected the landowners' argument that Sep-
tember 3, 1986, the date the county filed the condemnation peti-
tion, was the date of the taking for purposes of determining inter-
est due to the landowners as just compensation. 19 The court noted
that interest is a part of just compensation only after property is
taken or damaged but before the award is made available to the
landowner. 20 The county's filing of the lis pendens memoranda
111. Id. at 12, 381 S.E.2d at 2.
112. Id. at 13, 381 S.E.2d at 3.
113. Id.
114. 237 Va. 400, 377 S.E.2d 430 (1989).
115. Id. at 406, 377 S.E.2d at 433.
116. 238 Va. 679, 686, 385 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1989).
117. Id. at 685, 385 S.E.2d at 608-09.
118. 237 Va. 669, 379 S.E.2d 356 (1989).
119. Id. at 673, 379 S.E.2d at 358; see Va. Const. Art. I, § 11 (just compensation must be
provided when property is taken or damaged for public uses).
120. Id. at 675, 379 S.E.2d at 359. "A landowner is not entitled to compensation, either
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and the condemnation suits did not constitute the taking. There-
fore, potential diminution in property value resulting from the
suits and the lis pendens memoranda did not constitute compensa-
ble damage to the property.' 2 ' The taking occurred simultaneously
with payment of the award and the passing of legal title. There-
fore, the landowners were not entitled to any interest on the
award.' 22
In the case of East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Riner,'s3 East
Tennessee Natural Gas Company (the condemnor) sought to con-
demn a portion of the lands of Riner (the landowner) to construct
and maintain two gas pipelines.12 The landowner retained the
right to use surface coal. The owner of the mineral rights to the
underlying seams of coal running through the property was not a
party to the condemnation proceeding.2 "
The commissioners heard expert testimony that the highest and
best use of the property was for strip mining, a use wholly incon-
sistent with the maintenance of gas pipelines which would run be-
tween two seams of coal. 126 There was a sharp contrast in the testi-
mony regarding the fair market value of the construction and
maintenance easement and damages to the residue. The con-
demnor appealed the commissioners' award of $35,000 for damages
to the residue, arguing that the court erred in permitting the com-
missioners to consider the prospective use and value of the prop-
erty if used for strip mining in determining fair market value.
2 7
The court agreed that the commissioners should have been in-
structed to disregard such evidence "because there was no compe-
tent evidence that the prospect of future strip mining had any ef-
fect upon the value of the landowner's interest in the residue
included in the award or as interest, while he maintains legal title, control over and use of
the property." Id.
121. Id. at 673, 379 S.E.2d at 348.
122. Id. at 675, 379 S.E.2d at 359. In the recent Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
case, In re Knightsbridge Development Co., 884 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1989), the court estab-
lished that filing a post-petition amendment to a notice of lis pendens does not violate the
bankruptcy automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C.S. § 362 (Law Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1990).
The purpose of a lis pendens is to provide notice of pending litigation. An amendment to a
lis pendens does not assert any control over the subject claim or property and has no effect
on the bankruptcy estate. Knightsbridge, 884 F.2d at 148.
123. 239 Va. 94, 387 S.E.2d 476 (1990).
124. Id. at 96, 387 S.E.2d at 477.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 96-97, 387 S.E.2d at 477-78.
127. Id.
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property immediately before the taking. '12s
F. Landlord and Tenant
In Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited,'29 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia was asked to determine whether the stat-
ute of limitations barred a tenant's cause of action for breach of a
lease. During lease negotiations, the landlord represented that it
would include standard hours of operation in each lease with te-
nants at the shopping center. This representation induced Lamps
Unlimited to enter into the lease.130 The landlord never enforced
the standard hours of operation. Lamps Unlimited terminated the
lease and vacated its premises six years later, and filed suit nine
years after the lease was executed alleging that the landlord
breached its obligations under the lease. 131
The tenant, in an effort to avoid the effect of the five-year stat-
ute of limitations, adopted a theory of continuous breach. Under
this theory, the landlord's continuous breach of the lease consti-
tuted multiple defaults giving rise to a new cause of action against
the landlord each day that it failed to enforce the hours of opera-
tion standard. 2 The court concluded that the five year statute of
limitations for written contracts' began to run immediately upon
the landlord's failure to enforce the standard hours of operation in
the first year of the lease.' 34 Therefore, the tenant's suit was barred
because it was filed three years after the statute had run.
The construction of a typewritten addition to a shopping center
lease was at issue in Great Falls Hardware Co. v. South Lakes Vil-
lage Center.'35 The addition provided that the tenant's obligation.
to pay its proportionate share of real estate taxes and common
area expenses would only be effective so long as ninety-five percent
of the other tenants were required to comply with the terms and
conditions "as herein provided."' 36
The language, which both parties stipulated to be unambiguous,
128. Id. at 100, 387 S.E.2d at 479.
129. 237 Va. 543, 379 S.E.2d 316 (1989).
130. Id. at 545, 379 S.E.2d at 317.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 546, 379 S.E.2d at 317.
133. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
134. Lamps Unlimited, 237 Va. at 549, 379 S.E.2d at 319.
135. 238 Va. 123, 380 S.E.2d 642 (1989).
136. Id. at 124, 380 S.E.2d at 643.
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clearly meant that the tenant was only required to pay the costs so
long as ninety-five percent of the other tenants complied with pro-
visions similar to those in the tenant's lease, not those in the other
tenants' leases. 13 7 The trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evi-
dence' 38 and in rewriting the lease.'39
In the case of Love v. Schmidt,40 a landlord attempted to dis-
claim liability for injury to a tenant's employee on the grounds
that the landlord delegated to an independent contractor the land-
lord's common-law duty to maintain his premises in a reasonably
safe condition. The loose toilet seat which caused the plaintiff to
fall and injure her back had been twice reported to the indepen-
dent contractor who failed to repair it.'4 ' The court held that the
duty to maintain the premises cannot be delegated. Under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior and agency principles, the landlord's
agent's knowledge of the condition of the toilet seat was imputed
to the landlord.'42
In Reston Recreation Center Associates v. Reston Property In-
vestors Ltd.,43 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered four is-
sues: (1) whether the tenant was required to maintain public liabil-
ity insurance for its subtenant's business activity on the premises
in accordance with the lease; (2) whether the doctrine of impossi-
bility of performance prevented the landlord from terminating the
lease when the tenant failed to maintain such insurance or in the
alternative, whether the force majeure provisions in the lease ap-
plied to the tenant's inability to obtain insurance; (3) whether the
tenant's refusal to vacate the premises upon the landlord's demand
prevented the tenant from benefitting from a lease provision re-
quiring the landlord to pay the tenant $225,000 for the tenant's
personal property if the landlord required the tenant to leave the
personal property on the premises; and (4) the proper measure of
damages for the tenant's retention of the premises.'4 These issues
arose out of the landlord's termination of a commercial lease
before the stated expiration date due to the tenant's failure to
137. Id.
138. Id. at 126, 380 S.E.2d at 644.
139. Id.
140. 239 Va. 357, 389 S.E.2d 707 (1990).
141. Id. at 359, 389 S.E.2d at 710.
142. Id. at 358, 389 S.E.2d at 708.
143. 238 Va. 419, 384 S.E.2d 607 (1989).
144. Id. at 421-22, 384 S.E.2d at 608.
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carry liability insurance as required by the lease.1 45 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the landlord and the tenant
appealed.
The facts briefly stated are as follows. The landlord leased facili-
ties to the tenant for use as a recreation center. The lease required
the tenant to provide the landlord with public liability insurance
with respect to the premises in specified coverage amounts, but did
not specify the risks to be insured. The tenant maintained the re-
quired public liability insurance protecting the landlord, tenant,
and several subtenants in the occupation and use of the premises,
including business activities on the premises until October 2, 1985,
when the insurance carrier cancelled the public liability insurance
on roller skating activities in the premises. The tenant, despite dil-
igent efforts, was unable to obtain public liability insurance for the
operation of the rink.146 The landlord gave the tenant notice of de-
fault with thirty days to comply with the lease terms. Within the
thirty-day period, the tenant formed a wholly owned subsidiary
and subleased the roller skating rink operation to the subsidiary.
The tenant obtained a public liability insurance policy for the sub-
tenant, but the policy failed to meet the minimum insurance re-
quirements of the lease.14 7 The landlord gave the tenant notice ter-
minating the lease and demanded possession within five days after
the tenant's receipt of the notice. The landlord also gave the ten-
ant notice that it was exercising its right under the lease to
purchase the tenant's personal property for $225,000 upon the ex-
piration of the term of the lease. 48
With respect to the insurance requirement issue, the court noted
that while the lease only required public liability insurance with
respect to the premises and did not specify the risks to be covered,
during the first four years of the lease, the tenant maintained busi-
ness activity public liability coverage on the premises. This course
of dealing defined the type of insurance required and bound the
tenant to obtain such insurance for the duration of the lease.149
The court also rejected the tenant's alternative argument that
the insurance requirement did not apply to the subtenant's roller
skating rink on the premises. Although the lease did not require
145. Id. at 421, 384 S.E.2d at 609.
146. Id. at 423, 384 S.E.2d at 609.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 425, 384 S.E.2d at 610.
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the tenant to obtain insurance for its subtenants, the tenant could
not relieve itself of the insurance requirement by entering into a
sublease without the landlord's consent.15 Because the landlord
did not consent to the sublease, the landlord could require the ten-
ant, as the operator of the skating rink, to obtain the required pub-
lic liability insurance. 151
The tenant argued that even if it was required to obtain the
public liability insurance, its failure to obtain the insurance was
excused by the doctrine of impossibility of performance. 5 ' The
court noted that even if the doctrine applied, it excuses future per-
formance by both parties; the doctrine would not modify the con-
tract to require the landlord to accept less than the required insur-
ance coverage. 5 However, the court determined that the force
majeure provisions of the lease could be applied to temporarily ex-
cuse the tenant's failure to obtain the required insurance
coverage.'
The third issue focused on the tenant's failure to vacate the
premises. The court determined that the tenant's failure to vacate
the premises in accordance with the landlord's demand precluded
the tenant from successfully asserting its right to the payment of
$225,000 in consideration for the tenant's personal property left on
the premises. 55 The tenant, as a condition to its entitlement to the
$225,000, was obliged to comply with the landlord's demand to va-
cate, whether or not the demand was justified. 56
The last issue addressed by the court stems from the tenant's
argument that the landlord's five-day notice to vacate was ineffec-
tive. In the court's opinion, the tenant's failure to vacate the prem-
ises did not convert the tenancy into a tenancy from month to
month requiring thirty-days' notice of termination under another
150. Id. The court rejected the tenant's reliance on a provision of the lease creating an
exception to the requirement that the landlord's consent be obtained to a sublease where
"the effect of any such transfer is only to change the form of business entity or organization
of the tenant." The creation of a subsidiary was not a change in form of the tenant; the
subsidiary was a stranger to the lease. Id.
151. Id. The court also rejected the tenant's argument that because the insurance was not
really necessary for the landlord's protection, the tenant's failure to obtain the insurance
was not a material breach. Id. at 426, 384 S.E.2d at 610.
152. Id. at 426, 384 S.E.2d at 611.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 427, 384 S.E.2d at 611.
155. Id. at 428, 384 S.E.2d at 612.
156. Id.
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provision of the lease. The five-day termination notice effectively
terminated the lease and converted the tenant into a trespasser
subject to ejectment. 16 7
G. Mechanic's Liens
In Rosser v. Cole,158 the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to
rule on the validity of a mechanic's lien claimed by a road builder
purporting to affect lots in a subdivision. Rosser recorded a plat
subdividing 450 acres into 77 lots in Gloucester County. Rosser en-
tered into a contract with Cole for the construction of roads in the
subdivision. Cole filed a memorandum of mechanic's lien. The
description contained in the mechanic's lien purported to encum-
ber the entire 450 acre tract less nine specific lots. Rosser brought
suit attacking the validity of the mechanic's lien. 59 The trial court
dismissed Rosser's petition and ruled that Cole's mechanic's lien
was valid. Rosser appealed.6 0
The court determined that the mechanic's lien only affected the
roads or streets on which Cole worked and not the individual
lots. '' Cole's memorandum of mechanic's lien did not affect the
lots because it failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for
perfecting a mechanic's lien for work done involving the construc-
tion of streets in a subdivision. 162 The memorandum failed to ap-
157. Id. at 429, 384 S.E.2d at 612.
158. 237 Va. 572, 379 S.E.2d 323 (1989).
159. Id. at 573-74, 379 S.E.2d at 324.
160. Id. at 574, 379 S.E.2d at 324.
161. Id. at 576, 379 S.E.2d at 325. Section 43-3(a) of the Code of Virginia provides:
(a) All persons performing labor or furnishing materials of the value of fifty dollars or
more, for the construction, removal, repair or improvement of any building or struc-
ture permanently annexed to the freehold. . . shall have a lien, if perfected as here-
inafter provided, upon such building or structure, and so much land therewith as
shall be necessary for the convenient use and enjoyment thereof. . . for the work
done and materials furnished.
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3(a) (Repl. Vol. 1986)..
162. Id. Section 43-3(b) provides, in part:
(b) Any person providing labor or materials for the installation of streets, sanitary
sewers or water lines for the purpose of providing access or service to the individual
lots in a development.. . shall have a lien on each individual lot in the development
for that fractional part of the total cost of such labor or materials as is obtained by
using 'one' as the numerator and the number of lots as the denominator . . . pro-
vided, however, no such lien shall be valid as to any lot. . . unless the person provid-
ing such labor or materials shall, prior to the sale of such lot. . .file with the clerk of
the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which such land lies a document setting forth a
full disclosure of the nature of the lien to be claimed, the amount claimed against
each lot. . . and a description of the development. . . and shall, thereafter, comply
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
portion the amount claimed among the individual lots. 163 Relying
on the often repeated rule that mechanics' liens, being in deroga-
tion of the common law, must strictly comply with the statutory
requirements creating them, the court reversed the trial court's
decision.16 4
The mechanic's lien suits in Mendenhall v. Cooper, 65 were dis-
missed because they were not timely filed against new, necessary
defendants. Such suits must be brought within six months of re-
cording a memorandum of lien. 66 The lienors filed a bill of com-
plaint against the condominium developer, 61 but delayed more
than a year after filing the memoranda to amend their complaint
to add as defendants the condominium unit owners, the lender se-
cured by a deed of trust on the property, and the trustees under
the deed of trust. 68
The court determined that the new defendants were necessary
parties in the enforcement suits because their interests in the
property were subject to and could be affected by the mechanic's
liens.'69 The six month period mandated by section 43-17 had
lapsed by the time the new necessary defendants were joined,
therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the suit. 70
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered for the first time the
validity of mechanic's liens asserted against several parcels of land
upon some of which the claimants performed no work or contrib-
uted no value. In Woodington Electric, Inc. v. Lincoln Savings &
Loan Association,'7' the claimants argued that their liens should
be upheld against the appropriate properties and dismissed as to
those properties improperly included in the memorandum of
lien. 172
The court rejected the claimants' arguments and concluded that
with all other applicable provisions of this chapter.
Id. § 43-3(b).
163. Rosser, 237 Va. at 578, 379 S.E.2d at 327.
164. Id.
165. 239 Va. 71, 76, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1990).
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
167. Mendenhall, 239 at 73, 387 S.E.2d at 469.
168. Id. at 75, 387 S.E.2d at 470.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 76, 387 S.E.2d at 471.
171. 238 Va. 623, 385 S.E.2d 872 (1989).
172. Id. at 633, 385 S.E.2d at 877.
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an over-inclusive lien is invalid in its entirety.17 A mechanic's lien
is a creature of statute and is in derogation of the common law.
Therefore, the mechanic's lien statutes are strictly construed. 174
Mechanic's liens may only attach to property upon which work was
performed or materials supplied. By asserting liens against inap-
propriate properties, the claimants overreached and abused the
power conferred by the mechanic's lien statutes.171
In McCoy v. Chrysler Condo Developers,'176 a building owner's
bankruptcy involved the automatic stay which prohibited the
claimant from filing a suit to enforce his mechanic's lien.,17 Within
the six months following the filing of the memorandum of lien, the
claimant obtained a modification of the stay from the bankruptcy
court, and was granted permission to file an enforcement suit. The
claimant filed his bill of complaint thirty-three days after entry of
the modification order. 78 The trial court, interpreting the bank-
ruptcy court order as a termination of the stay, dismissed the
claimant's suit as time-barred pursuant to section 108(c) of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. 79 However, the bankruptcy court
order only modified the stay, it did not terminate the stay. 80
Therefore, the enforcement suit was not time-barred.' 8 '
H. Real Estate Brokers
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Harrison & Bates, Inc. v.
LSR Corp.,'8 2 that a real estate broker not licensed in Virginia may
not enforce a contract with a Virginia licensed real estate broker to
split commissions which were earned on the sale of real estate lo-
cated in Virginia. 8 3 This holding extends the requirement that any
person who buys or sells real estate must be licensed to include
persons who contract to share real estate commissions.8 4
173. Id. at 634, 385 S.E.2d at 878.
174. Id. at 630, 385 S.E.2d at 875; see supra note 158.
175. Id. at 634, 385 S.E.2d at 878.
176. 239 Va. 321, 389 S.E.2d 905 (1990).
177. Id. at 323, 389 S.E.2d at 906.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 324, 389 S.E.2d at 907. 11 U.S.C.S. § 108(c)(2) permits an enforcement suit
within "30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay." 11 U.S.C.S. §
108(c)(2) (Law. Co-op. Cure. Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
180. McCoy, 239 Va. at 323, 389 S.E.2d at 907.
181. Id. at 324, 389 S.E.2d at 907.
182. 238 Va. 741, 385 S.E.2d 624 (1989).
183. Id. at 747, 385 S.E.2d at 627; see VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2106 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
184. Harrison, 238 Va. at 747, 385 S.E.2d at 627.
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In Allen v. Lindstrom,'8 5 the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered whether a real estate agent has a duty to purchasers to com-
municate offers to sellers and whether purchasers were entitled to
specific performance. The sellers received a series of offers and
counter offers from two parties through two separate agents. The
sellers subsequently learned, after signing a contract, that one of
the agents failed to inform them of an offer containing conditions
more favorable to the sellers. They then sold the property to the
purchasers who presented the more favorable terms and refused to
honor the first contract.'86 The purchasers under the first contract
sued, but the trial court did not grant specific performance of their
contract with the sellers. 18 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the pur-
chasers were entitled to specific performance.' The court further
determined that the agent's failure to reveal information to the
sellers did not preclude specific performance for the benefit of the
purchasers absent evidence of any misconduct by the
purchasers." 9
With respect to the suit against the real estate firm and agent,
the court declined to find that a duty was owed to prospective pur-
chasers to communicate offers to the sellers. 90 The court deter-
mined that a regulation of the Virginia Real Estate Commission
requiring real estate licensees to promptly tender all written offers
to purchase property to a seller does not create a private cause of
action for the benefit of prospective purchasers.' "[T]he public is
protected adequately from the type of misconduct asserted by the
plaintiffs by administrative regulation and policing of the real es-
tate profession. "192
In Edmonds v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Ser-
vices, Inc.,'9" the issue considered by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia was whether a real estate broker was entitled to negotiate a
contract on behalf of a seller during a ninety day protection period
after termination of a listing agreement. The sellers listed their
185. 237 Va. 489, 379 S.E.2d 450 (1989).
186. Id. at 495, 379 S.E.2d at 455.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 497, 379 S.E.2d at 455.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 498, 379 S.E.2d at 456.
191. Id. See VIRGINIA REAL ESTATE BOARD LICENSING REGULATIONS § 3.5.16 (1987).
192. Allen, 237 Va. at 500, 379 S.E.2d at 456.
193. 237 Va. 428, 377 S.E.2d 443 (1989).
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property for a term of six .months. The contract provided that the
real estate commission would be paid if the property "is sold...
within 90 days after the termination of this agreement. . . to any-
one with whom the agent has negotiated or to whom the property
has been shown by any person prior to. . .termination.' 194 During
the listing agreement, several offers from county officials to
purchase the property were communicated to the sellers. However,
the sellers rejected the county's proposals. After the ninety day
protection period expired, the sellers sold the property to the
county. 95
The real estate broker sought to obtain his commission claiming
that he was the procuring cause of the sale and that he had pro-
duced a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy upon the terms
set forth in the listing agreement.'96 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed the trial court's judgment for the real estate broker
and found that the sellers had not interfered with the real estate
broker's right to continue negotiations with the county during the
protection period; that right did not exist.
97
I. Record Title
Lester Group, Inc. v. Little,9 ' arose out of an ejectment action.
The Lester Group, Inc. ("Lester") derived its title to property lo-
cated in Franklin County from Grant. Grant acquired title in 1845
by a land grant from the Commonwealth of Virginia which was not
recorded until 1957. By deed dated March 4, 1878, a special com-
missioner conveyed the property to Mitchell and Cabell as the re-
sult of a creditors' suit. The deed was indexed only in the commis-
sioner's name. In 1960, a special commissioner sold the property to
Saunders to recover delinquent real estate taxes after service of
process by order of publication and suit against Grant and his
heirs, devisees, assigns and unknown heirs.i99 Saunders conveyed
the property to the Jessups. 00 Rhodes, a trustee, foreclosed on the
property under a deed of trust executed by the Jessups. At the
foreclosure sale, Lester publicly announced that he claimed title to
194. Id. at 430, 377 S.E.2d at 444.
195. Id. at 431, 377 S.E.2d at 445.
196. Id. at 431-32, 377 S.E.2d at 445.
197. Id. at 432, 377 S.E.2d at 445.
198. 238 Va. 54, 381 S.E.2d 3 (1989).
199. Id. at 55-56, 381 S.E.2d at 4-5.
200. Id. at 56, 381 S.E.2d at 5.
1990] 749
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the property. Roberts purchased the property at the foreclosure
sale with full knowledge of Lester's claim. Roberts subsequently
conveyed the property to Little.2"'
The court determined that the tax sale and conveyance to Saun-
ders were void ab initio since taxes on the property were in fact
paid by Lester and his predecessors in title.20 2 Therefore, Little
had no title to the property. The court noted further that because
a special commissioner executed the 1878 deed to Cabell, the
Franklin County assessing officials were not entitled to rely solely
on the index to deeds for determining who held title to the prop-
erty. Had the officials read the special commissioner's deed, they
would have learned that the special commissioner conveyed the
property on behalf of Grant's heirs and avoided a double assess-
ment on the property.20 '
J. Restrictive Covenants
In Williams v. Brooks,0 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the following restrictive covenant did not prohibit mobile
homes in a residential subdivision:
No structure of a temporary character, that is, a trailer, basement,
tent, shack, garage, barn, or other outbuilding shall be used on any
lot at any time as a residence either temporarily or permanently if it
can be seen from any adjoining lot or from the road(s) adjoining said
lot . ... 205
Owners of lots in a residential subdivision sought and obtained a
mandatory injunction requiring mobile home owners in the subdi-
vision to remove their mobile homes. 06 The mobile homes were
permanently affixed to the realty.10 7 The court determined that the
restrictive covenant was ambiguous when applied to the mobile
homes s.2 0  The court noted that restrictive covenants are not fa-
201. Id.
202. Id. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5.
203. Id. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5-6.
204. 238 Va. 224, 383 S.E.2d 712 (1989).
205. Id. at 225, 383 S.E.2d at 712.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 225-26, 383 S.E.2d at 712-13. The hitches, wheels and springs were removed
from the mobile homes; permanent piers, concrete footings, foundation, decks and brick
steps were installed. Id.
208. Id. at 227, 383 S.E.2d at 713.
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vored and should be construed not to limit the use of property.20 9
K. Subjacent Support
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
fused to rule that a surface property owner's right to subjacent
support is violated by mere subsidence of the surface. In Large v.
Clinchfield Coal Co., 210 a surface property owner (Large) and the
owner of the coal under the surface (Clinchfield) both appealed a
trial court order which prohibited Clinchfield from "longwall" coal
mining beneath Large's property and which ruled that "longwall"
mining would not damage the surface "to any appreciable de-
gree."21' The court stated that the "'absolute' nature of the right
to subjacent support merely implies strict liability for its viola-
tion."2" A surface landowner must establish appreciable damage or
a diminution in use to maintain a cause of action.21 3 The court con-
cluded that the uniform subsidence of the surface in the form of a
three foot deep swale above the excavated areas would not consti-
tute appreciable damage,214 and ruled that Clinchfield could con-
tinue its "longwall" mining operation.
L. Zoning and Land Use
The Supreme Court of Virginia invalidated the zoning ordinance
at issue in City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Investment
Association.1 6 In this case, Virginia Land Investment Association
("VLIA") property was rezoned from a planned unit development
209. Id. at 228, 383 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Hullett v. Grayson, 265 N.C. 453, 454, 144 S.E.2d
206, 207 (1965)).
210. 239 Va. 144, 387 S.E.2d 783 (1990).
211. Id. at 146, 387 S.E.2d at 784. The "Iongwall" method of coal mining involves the
removal of subsurface seams of coal in a manner which allows the exhausted area to cave in
and causes the land surface to subside. Id.
212. Id. at 147, 387 S.E.2d at 785.
213. Id. at 148, 387 S.E.2d at 785.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 149, 387 S.E.2d at 785-86. Justice Russell and Justice Stephenson dissented,
citing Stonegap C. Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 289, 89 S.E. 305, 310 (1916), which estab-
lished a surface landowner's absolute right to surface support in Virginia. Evidence was
produced to show that "longwall" mining "will cause the surface to subside into five swales,
each three feet deep, 600 to 700 feet wide, and 3,000 to 5,000 feet long" across the property.
Large, 239 Va. at 150, 387 S.E.2d at 787. According to the dissent, these conditions are
similar to the consequences of a major earthquake and do show irreparable damage to the
surface entitling the surface owner to injunctive relief.
216. 239 Va. 412, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990).
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district to an agricultural district. The court determined the zoning
ordinance to be "piecemeal" downzoning and not a "comprehen-
sive" rezoning as characterized by the city.21
The question in determining the validity of piecemeal downzon-
ing is whether a change in circumstances or prior mistake justified
the downzoning. The city admitted no change in circumstances af-
fecting the public health, safety or welfare and presented no evi-
dence of mistake.218 The city failed to rebut VLIA's prima facie
case that the downzoning was unjustified, therefore, the ordinance
was held to be unreasonable and void. However, the court rejected
VLIA's argument that it should have been awarded damages for
the temporary regulatory taking of its property. The court said no
taking occurred because VLIA was not deprived of all economi-
cally viable use of its land.219
In Beacon Hill Farm Associates II, Ltd. v. Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors,220 the Fourth Circuit held that a developer's
claim that a zoning ordinance was facially unconstitutional was
ripe for adjudication and remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings. The county had amended its zoning ordi-
nance by creating an overlay zoning district to protect environmen-
tally sensitive mountain lands.22' As a consequence, 650 acres of
land belonging to Beacon Hill could not be developed pursuant to
the more relaxed requirements of the underlying A-3 zoning.222
Beacon Hill had not subdivided the property prior to the enact-
ment of the ordinance, nor had Beacon Hill applied for a special
exception from the ordinance. 2 3 The county argued that Beacon
Hill's claim was premature based on its failure to apply for a spe-
cial exception and receive a final determination of how the ordi-
nance would affect its land use. 4
The court distinguished a claim that the mere enactment of a
regulation is unconstitutional from a claim that the application of
a regulation to specific property is unconstitutional. 225 A facial at-
217. Id. at 416, 389 S.E.2d at 314.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 875 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1989). The developer sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
221. Id. at 1081.
222. Id. at 1082.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1084.
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tack on the constitutionality of an ordinance which alleges that the
mere existence of the ordinance adversely affects property rights is
permissible without a determination of how the applied ordinance
will affect the actual use of property where the ordinance greatly
reduces the value of the property and destroys its marketability. 26
The importance of building a record in zoning cases was eminent
in Ames v. Town of Painter.2 7 The trial court overturned a board
of zoning grant of a special use permit for a migrant labor camp.
The board made no express findings or conclusions regarding the
standards which were provided in the zoning ordinance for the is-
suance of special use permits.228 Therefore there was no basis in
the record for a reviewing court to determine whether the "fairly
debatable" standard could be established. 29 The Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the trial court, stating that "the 'fairly debata-
ble' standard cannot be established by a silent record. 2 30
It was held in Crestar Bank v. Martin,3' that a family subdivi-
sion which is exempt from the subdivision ordinance is neverthe-
less subject to land-use controls. The Martins' conveyances of their
land to their daughters was held to be a subdivision within the
contemplation of the zoning ordinance which prohibited the erec-
tion of mobile homes on private lots in subdivisions.2 32
Marks v. City of Chesapeake233 involved a federal civil rights ac-
tion where the owner of a house sought injunctive and declaratory
relief and compensatory and punitive damages when the city de-
nied him a conditional use permit to operate a palmistry and for-
tune telling business.3 4 The B-2 classification specifically enumer-
ated palmistry as a permitted use. During the public hearing, most
of the residents who spoke against issuing the permit expressed
226. Id. at 1084-85.
227. 239 Va. 343, 389 S.E.2d 702 (1990).
228. Id. at 349-50, 389 S.E.2d at 705.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 350, 389 S.E.2d at 706. Justice Whiting dissented, stating that taken as a
whole, the record itself established that the standards in the zoning ordinance were consid-
ered by the board and that the issue was fairly debatable. Justice Whiting would have found
the Board's action proper, or, in the alternative, would have remanded the case and directed
the Board to express the reasons for its grant of the special use permit. Id. at 350-52, 389
S.E.2d at 706-07.
231. 238 Va. 232, 236, 383 S.E.2d 714, 716 (1989).
232. Id.
233. 883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989).
234. Id. at 310. Plaintiff's action alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
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religious reasons for opposing the permit. Two council members
admitted that they were influenced by the public opposition. s35
The court recognized Marks' fourteenth amendment claim and
said public officials cannot decide permit applications by relying
on public sentiment "instead of legislative determinations concern-
ing public health and safety [or otherwise] dealing with zoning. "236
The court found no clear error in its review of the district court
decision and so affirmed the ruling that the city acted arbitrarily
and capriciously when it withheld Marks' permit because of reli-
gious prejudice expressed by the neighborhood.237
In Resource Conservation Management v. Board of Supervisors,
Resource Conservation Management ("RCM") had applied for a
special use permit to operate a debris landfill on a site which per-
mitted such use. 3s While the application was pending, the Board
of Supervisors amended the zoning ordinance to prohibit debris
landfills in three zoning districts.23 9 The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision that the ordinance was within
the Board's delegated power 240 and that the ordinance was not in
conflict with nor preempted by the Virginia Solid Waste Manage-
ment Act.24' The court rejected RCM's argument that the ordi-
nance was one regulating the ownership of land instead of a zoning
ordinance.242
II. LEGISLATION
A. Condominiums
Sections 55-79.74:1243 and 55-79.75244 of the Code of Virginia
(the "Code") relating to the Condominium Act have been
amended. Section 55-79.74:1 of the Code now provides that unit
owners are entitled to copies of unit owners' association records
and minutes of meetings of the members and the executive organ
235. Id. at 312.
236. Id. at 311 (quoting Bayou Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir.
1977)).
237. Id. at 313.
238. 238 Va. 15, 380 S.E.2d 879 (1989).
239. Id. at 17, 380 S.E.2d at 880.
240. Id. at 20, 380 S.E.2d at 882.
241. Id. at 22, 380 S.E.2d at 883-84.
242. Id. at 21, 380 S.E.2d at 882.
243. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.74:1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
244. Id. § 55-79.75.
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at a reasonable cost. However, matters considered in closed session
of the executive organ need not be made available to unit
owners.
245
The General Assembly broadened the scope of issues the execu-
tive organ of a condominium may consider in closed session. Sec-
tion 55-79.75 of the Code now provides that the executive organ
may meet in closed session to discuss threatened or pending litiga-
tion, violations of the condominium documents or rules and the
liability of unit owners to the association.246
B. Deeds
Any instrument submitted for recordation pursuant to sections
17-59,247 17-60,248 and 17-79,249 of the Code must include the names
of all grantors and grantees in the first clause of the instrument in
accordance with sections 55-48250 and 55-58211 of the Code. The in-
strument will only be indexed under those names appearing in the
first clause. The form of deed contained in section 55-48 of the
Code has been amended to include within the description of the
property the name of the city or county in which the property is
located.252
C. Dower and Curtesy
Important legislation passed by the General Assembly this ses-
sion was the amendment of section 64.1-19.2253 which, effective
January 1, 1991, abolishes the interests of dower and curtesy. Any
dower or curtesy interest of a surviving spouse which vested prior
to January 1, 1991, however, will not be changed or diminished.
The right of a creditor or other interested third party in any real
estate subject to a right of dower and curtesy will not be changed
or diminished. The rights of these parties will be governed by the
245. Id. § 55-79.74:1.
246. Id. § 55-79.75.
247. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-59 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (duties of a clerk as to recording and
indexing writings).
248. Id. § 17-60 (documents to be recorded).
249. Id. § 17-79 (general index of clerk).
250. Id. § 55-48 (Cur. Supp. 1990) (forms of deeds and leases).
251. Id. § 55-58 (forms of deeds of trust).
252. Id. § 55-48.
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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laws in effect prior to January 1, 1991.254
In the same act, the General Assembly amended section 64.1-13
of the Code255 which allows a surviving spouse within six months to
claim an elective share in the spouse's augmented estate. Section
64.1-16.1 was added to define augmented estate, and to provide for
exclusions and valuation. 256 "Augmented estate" is defined as the
gross real and personal estate less payments for certain allowances
and exceptions, funeral expenses, administration charges and debts
plus the total value of:
1) property derived from the decedent without full consideration
in money or money's worth;
2) property transferred by the surviving spouse, at any time dur-
ing the marriage, to a person, other than the decedent, which
would have been included in the augmented estate if the surviving
spouse had predeceased the decedent; and
3) property transferred to anyone other than a bona fide pur-
chaser for which the decedent did not receive full and adequate
consideration, including the following types of transfers: where the
decedent retained a life estate or a right to income from the prop-
erty; where the decedent retained revocable powers; where the de-
cedent was a joint tenant with a right of survivorship or where the
transfer was made causa mortis or any aggregate transfers which
exceeded $10,000 to a single donee in a calendar year.257
Excluded from the augmented estate are transfers in which the
surviving spouse joined or consented, the decedent's separate prop-
erty received by gift, will or intestate succession, and transfers
which are irrevocable as of January 1, 1991.258 "Estate" and "prop-
erty" does include insurance policies, retirement benefits, annui-
ties, pension plans, deferred compensation arrangements and em-
ployee benefit plans.259 This statute fails to limit the period of time
for which property may be brought back into the augmented
estate.
254. Id.
255. Id. § 64.1-13.
256. Id. § 64.1-16.1.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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D. Eminent Domain
Section 33.1-96 of the Code 260 provides for the acquisition of
property needed for a highway project, where the property is cur-
rently owned or occupied by a railroad or public utility company
for public use. In exchange for such property and the relocation of
improvements upon the taken land, the section provides for the
acquisition of land or easements, rights-of-way or interests in land
adjacent to or near the land needed for the highway project and
the conveyance of the same to the railroad or public utility.26 ' The
General Assembly amended this section to add any public service
corporation or company, political subdivision, or cable television
company as entities whose interests in land needed for a highway
project would be subject to condemnation and eligible for reloca-
tion pursuant to section 33.1-96.262
E. Financing Statements
In a move to establish uniformity in the system of indexing fi-
nancing statements, the General Assembly has amended sections
8.9-403 to 8.9-406 of Code.263 Filing officers will now index financ-
ing statements by name of the debtor and the year the statement
was filed. This procedure applies to all subsequent statements,
such as continuations, terminations, assignments and releases of
collateral.264
F. Foreclosure
The General Assembly amended section 26-58 of the Code2 5 to
provide that where the trustee in a deed of trust to secure a debt
owed to a corporation is a stockholder, member, employee, officer
or director of, or counsel to the corporation, the trustee is not dis-
qualified, nor does his position render the sale voidable, so long as
the trustee does not participate in setting the amount to be bid at
the sale of the trust property. If the lender bids the amount se-
cured, including interests and costs, the trustee's participation
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-96 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.9-403 to -406 (Cure. Supp. 1990).
264. Id.
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-58 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
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would not be improper and would not render the sale voidable.266
This legislation is retroactive.
The amendment of section 55-59.2 of the Code267 clarifies that
where a deed of trust provides for daily newspaper advertisement
for three days, the three days may be consecutive. Where the deed
of trust does not provide for the number of publications and if the
property is located in a city or a county immediately contiguous to
a city, regardless of the size of the city, then the five different pub-
lications required by statute may be on consecutive days.2 68
G. Homestead and Other Exemptions
The General Assembly updated chapter 3 of title 34 of the Code
relating to property exempt from creditor process.26 9 The exemp-
tions are available to any Virginia resident, and an additional $500
exemption is permitted for each dependent. Exemptions do not ap-
ply to spousal or child support obligations. The statute also sets
forth specific forms to be used for filing a homestead deed for real
property and a homestead deed for personal property.
The amendments also provide monetary limits as to certain arti-
cles of personal property which are exempt. The intent of the
amended language appears to protect a debtor's ability to maintain
his occupation or trade and to sustain a daily existence. The ex-
emption for insurance benefits has been repealed and an exception
for personal injury actions, awards or settlements has been added.
Subsection B of the newly enacted section 34-3427o of the Code
provides that the interest of an individual under a retirement plan
is exempt from creditor process to a certain extent. The exemption
is available to an individual whether his interest is that of a par-
ticipant, beneficiary, contingent annuitant, alternate payee or oth-
erwise, but must be claimed within certain time limits.2 7 1 The ex-
266. Section 26-58 was apparently amended in response to United States v. Smith, 99
Bankr. 724 (Bankr. W.D.Va. 1989). The foreclosure sale in Smith was held to be invalid due
to the lack of the trustee's impartiality. The trustee was an employee of the Farmers Home
Administration, the secured party, and had been actively involved throughout the disposi-
tion of the debtor's loan and property.
267. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
268. Id.
269. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1. 34-3, 34-4, 34-4.1, 34-5, 34-6, 34-13, 34-14, 34-17, 34-18, 34-19,
34-21, 34-26, 34-28.1, 38.2-3123 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
270. Id. § 34-34.
271. Id. § 34.17.
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emption does not apply if the interest would provide an annual
benefit in excess of $17,500; does not apply to earnings on contri-
butions made to the retirement plan during the fiscal year which
includes the date the individual claims the exemption and for the
two preceding fiscal years; and does not apply to claims made
against an individual by the alternate payee or the
Commonwealth. 2
In related legislation, the General Assembly amended section 55-
19273 to provide that the exception that spendthrift trusts are not
subject to the debts and charges of the beneficiaries does not apply
to an interest in a trust, contract, other fund maintained in con-
junction with certain employee benefit plans, or similar plans re-
gardless of whether the beneficiary claims the exemption under
section 34-34.
H. Marital Property
Section 20-107.3 of the Code27 4 relating to equitable distribution
now includes language describing when property may be classified
as part marital property and part separate property. Income re-
ceived from and the increase in value of separate property during
the marriage is marital property only to the extent that marital
property or the significant personal efforts of either party contrib-
uted to the income or the increase and resulted in substantial ap-
preciation of the property.27 5 A marital share may be established in
part of a pension plan, profit-sharing plan, retirement plan, per-
sonal injury or worker's compensation award.
If separate property and marital property are commingled to the
extent the contributed property loses its identity, then the contrib-
uted property is transmuted to the category of the property receiv-
ing the contribution. Contributed property may retain its original
classification if it can be retraced by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and was not a gift. Where marital and separate property are
commingled into newly acquired property, it is transmuted into
marital property unless it is retraceable by a preponderance of the
272. See id. § 63.1-251 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
273. Id. § 55-19 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107.3 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
275. Id. Personal effort of a party includes labor, effort, inventiveness, physical or intel-
lectual skill, creativity or managerial activity, promotional or marketing activity, which has
been directly applied to the separate property of either party. Id.
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evidence and was not a gift.276
I. Real Estate Appraisers
Perceiving a need for the regulation of real estate appraisers, the
General Assembly amended sections 2.1-1.6277, 2.1 -20 .4 271, 9_
6.25:2279 and 54.1-300280 of the Code and added chapter 20.1 in title
54.1, consisting of sections 54.1-2009 through 54.1-2019281. The ef-
fect of this legislation is the creation of a nine member Real Estate
Appraiser Board within the Virginia Department of Commerce.
Furthermore, it is now unlawful to engage in the appraisal of real
estate for compensation without a license.8 2 Certain exemptions
are provided for persons directly supervised by licensed appraisers,
public employees and the related activities of real estate brokers
and salespersons. 83
J. Recordation Tax
Subdivision H has been added to Code section 58.1-811,84 which
provides that the release of a contractual right is exempt from rec-
ordation tax if the release is contained in a single deed where an-
other function of the deed is subject to the recordation tax. Clerks'
fees for recording and indexing any writing, with certain excep-
tions, were raised from ten dollars to thirteen dollars for the first
four pages by amendments to sections 8.01-465.2215 and 14.1-112286
of the Code. The cost of each page over four pages remains one
dollar.
K. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
The General Assembly has amended section 55-248.4287 of the
Code to add the definition of a natural person. Co-owners, either
276. Id.
277. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-1.6 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
278. Id. § 2.1-20.4.
279. Id. § 9-6.25:2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
280. Id. § 54.1-800 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
281. Id. §§ 54.1-2009 to -2019.
282. Id. § 54.1-2011.
283. Id. § 54.1-2010.
284. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811 (Cure. Supp. 1990).
285. Id. § 8.01-465.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
286. Id. § 14.1-112 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
287. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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as tenants in common, joint tenants, tenants in partnership, te-
nants by the entirety, trustees or beneficiaries of a trust or any
lawful combination of natural persons permitted by law come
within the definition of natural person.288
L. Subdivisions
Section 15.1-466 of the Code,28 9 which outlines the requirements
for local subdivision ordinances, now provides that subdivision or-
dinances in certain high growth localities may provide for the divi-
sion of a lot or parcel for the purpose of sale or gift to a family
member. Such divisions are subject to all state and local
requirements.
In addition, the section now authorizes a subdivision ordinance
to permit the conveyance of shared easements to public service
corporations who provide cable television, gas, telephone and elec-
tric service to proposed subdivisions.28 0 The common easements
may be conveyed by reference on the final plat to a declaration of
the terms and conditions agreed upon by the public service corpo-
rations and recorded in the county or city land records.29'
Also, section 15.1-466 of the Code now authorizes local govern-
ments to transfer the assets contributed by developers on identi-
fied sewer, water and drainage projects in pro-rata programs to a
fund for a general sewer and drainage improvement program. 292
The subdividers and developers who met the terms of the agree-
ments under the previous pro-rata programs would receive out-
standing interest and be released from any further obligation. Pay-
ments made on pro-rata programs prior to the effective date of the
act will continue to be held in separate, interest bearing accounts
for the projects for which they were collected.293
Section 15.1-482294 has been amended to provide that where a
governing body wishes to vacate, by written instrument, a plat or
part of a plat on a lot that has been sold, it is only required to
obtain the signatures of the lot owners adjacent to the vacated
288. Id.
289. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466 (Supp. 1990).
290. Id. § 15.1-466(fl).
291. Id.
292. Id. § 15.1-466(j), (j1).
293. Id.
294. Id. § 15.1-482(a).
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area. This procedure applies only to those cases involving drainage
easements or street rights-of-way where the vacation does not im-
pede or alter drainage or access for any landowners other than the
adjacent landowners.2m
M. Taxation of Real Estate
Two sections have been added to the Code which require that
non-residents who receive rent or proceeds of sale from Virginia
real property must register with the Virginia Department of Taxa-
tion on prescribed forms. Section 58.1-316 of the Code296 provides
that any non-resident who receives $600 or more in a calendar year
from Virginia rental property must complete a registration form.
Any broker who makes rental payments to a non-resident must
keep a copy of the registration form in his files and is obligated to
file the original registration with the Department of Taxation or
incur a $50 a month penalty. The broker must file the registration
by the fifteenth of the month following receipt of the form from
the payee.29
Section 58.1-317298 imposes a similar registration requirement
upon non-residents who receive payments from the transfer of title
of Virginia real property. Registration must be concurrent with the
transfer of title. The real estate reporting person, as defined by
section 6045(e) of the Internal Revenue Code99 , must file the origi-
nal registration and retain a copy for his files.300 If a payee pro-
vides a certificate that the payment is not subject to corporation or
individual income tax, then the payee will be excused from regis-
tering. Failure to file the registration subjects the real estate re-
porting person to a fifty dollar a month penalty.30 1
For both sections, the statute broadly defines "non-resident
payee" to include every non-resident individual, estate, trust and
every partnership and S corporation which has non-resident part-
ners or shareholders, and all foreign corporations.0 2
295. Id.
296. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-316(A) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
297. Id. § 58.1-316(B).
298. Id. § 58.1-317(A).
299. I.R.C. § 6045(e) (West Supp. 1990). Virginia's new reporting requirement is similar
to the reporting requirement imposed by the Internal Revenue Service Form 1099-S.
300. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-317(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
301. Id. § 58.1-317(C).
302. Id. § 58.1-316(E), -317(E).
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An amendment to section 58.1-3967303 provides that in proceed-
ings where real estate is sold for delinquent taxes any person not
otherwise served shall be served by publication. A person served by
publication may petition to have the case reheard within one year
of the entry of the final decree and upon a showing of good
cause.
30 4
Section 58.1-3237 of the Code,310 as amended, provides that if
real property which qualified for assessment and taxation on the
basis of use, but was rezoned later, at the owner's request, to a
more intensive use prior to 1980, may be eligible for land use taxa-
tion if the owner applies for rezoning to agricultural, horticultural
open-space or forest use. Such property would be eligible for as-
sessment and taxation on the basis of the qualifying use for the tax
year following the effective date of the rezoning. If such property is
then subsequently rezoned to a more intensive use, at the owner's
request, within five years of being rezoned to a qualifying use, then
the owner will be liable for roll-back taxes when the property is
rezoned to a more intensive use.30 In addition to owing the roll-
back taxes, the owner would be subject to a penalty equal to fifty
percent of the amount of the roll-back taxes due. 0
Amended section 58.1-3233108 provides that localities may pass
ordinances which prescribe a minimum acreage greater than five
acres in order for real estate devoted to open-space use to qualify
for land use taxation. The minimum acreage requirement is deter-
mined by adding the total area of contiguous parcels excluding
subdivision lots recorded after July 1, 1983.09
N. Vacation and Abandonment of Public's Interest in Property
Section 15.1-480.1 of the Code, 10 as amended, provides two
methods whereby a local governing body can vacate the public in-
terests in streets; alleys and easements granted as a condition of
site plan approval. First, the public interests may be vacated by a
written, recorded instrument of the owner of the land, provided
303. Id. § 58.1-3967.
304. Id.
305. Id. § 58.1-3237.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. § 58.1-3233.
309. Id.
310. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-480.1 (Supp. 1990).
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the governing body consents to the vacation.3 11 In the alternative,
the local governing body may pass an ordinance which vacates the
public interests. 312 Notice and a public hearing are required before
the adoption of such an ordinance. The owner of the land may ap-
peal the adoption of the ordinance. If the court finds the owner
will be irreparably damaged, it may void the ordinance. If the ordi-
nance is upheld on appeal or not challenged, a certified copy may
then be recorded and will serve to vacate the governing body's
interests.3 13
An amendment to section 33.1-151314 of the Code clarifies that
only landowners whose property abuts the road, landing or cross-
ing proposed to be abandoned may petition for a public hearing.
Under amended section 33.1-152,311 only landowners whose prop-
erty abuts the parcel proposed to be abandoned have the right to
appeal the decision on abandonment. The right to appeal an aban-
donment decision is also limited to those landowners who were
among those who had previously petitioned for a public hearing.
Section 33.1-152 now requires that notice of appeal of an abandon-
ment must be served upon each member of the governing body
rather than the Commonwealth's attorney. The section further
provides that such appeals will be decided based upon the record
and evidence presented by the parties instead of a de novo
hearing.316
0. Zoning and Land Use
The General Assembly amended section 15.1-466 of the Code"1
to clarify that site plans or plans of development required by ordi-
nance pursuant to section 15.1-491(h)31 8 will be subject to the gen-
eral procedures required for subdivision plats and plans of devel-
opment under section 15.1-466.319
The General Assembly expanded the scope of zoning ordinances
and comprehensive plans through several amendments. For in-
311. Id. § 15.1-480.1(1).
312. Id. § 15.1-480.1(2).
313. Id.
314. Id. § 33.1-151 (Cum. Supp. 1990),
315. Id. § 33.1-152.
316. Id.
317. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466 (Supp. 1990).
318. Id. § 15.1-491(h).
319. Id. § 15.1-466.
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stance, an amendment to section 15.1-447 of the Code 2 ' provides
that the need for affordable housing may be one of the items stud-
ied in the preparation of a comprehensive plan.
Also, section 15.1-489 of the Code32' now provides that compre-
hensive plans may designate areas for and include measures to pro-
mote the construction and maintenance of affordable housing as
provided by amended section 15.1-446.322 Section 15.1-489313 has
also been amended to add the preservation of other lands of signif-
icance for the protection of the natural environment as a purpose
of zoning ordinances.
The definition of a mixed use development was changed in the
amendment of section 15.1-430314 so that it no longer needs to be
under a single ownership or legal description.
The General Assembly added section 15.1-486.3125 and repealed
section 15.1-486.2326 relating to local zoning ordinances applicable
to residential facilities for the disabled. Licensed residential facili-
ties which house no more than eight mentally ill, mentally handi-
capped or developmentally disabled persons, with one or more resi-
dent staff persons, shall be considered residential occupancy by a
single family.2 7 No conditions more restrictive than those imposed
on other single family residences may be imposed on such facili-
ties. The definitions of mental illness and developmental disability
do not include current illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance.2
Section 15.1-486.4 of the Code329 provides that in all agricultural
zoning districts, manufactured houses which are nineteen feet or
more in width, on a permanent foundation and on individual lots
are to be treated as equivalent to conventional, site-built single
family dwellings. Zoning regulations must apply to all residences in
agricultural zoning districts and may not exclude manufactured
housing.330
320. Id. § 15.1-447(a).
321. Id. § 15.1-489(10).
322. Id. § 15.1-446.1.
323. Id. § 15.1-489(8).
324. Id. § 15.1-430(r).
325. Id. § 15.1-486.3.
326. Id. § 15.1-486.2 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
327. Id. § 15.1-486.3 (Supp. 1990).
328. Id.
329. Id. § 15.1-486.4(A).
330. Id. § 15.1-486.4(B).
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Section 15.1-493... now provides that where an amendment to a
zoning map is proposed, the public notice must state the general
usage and density range of the amendment compared to that of the
comprehensive plan.
Section 15.1-499.1 of the Code332 has been amended to increase
the civil penalty for a single zoning violation in a ten-day period
from fifty to one hundred dollars. A series of violations which arise
from the same operative set of facts may not result in penalties
which exceed $3,000.333
Sections 15.1-491, 3 1 15.1-491.2"15 and 15.1-491.2:1336 all relate to
protecting the zoning of property from amendment after proffered
conditions have been accepted by the local governing body. Once
the governing body has accepted proffered conditions in a rezoning
case, the zoning will continue unless the property owner agrees to a
change or it can be established that there has been a mistake,
fraud or a change in circumstances which substantially affects the
public health, safety or welfare. Such proffered conditions must in-
clude dedications of real property of substantial value or substan-
tial cash payments for or construction of substantial public im-
provements which were not necessitated by the rezoning alone.3 37
For the first time the General Assembly has reversed a local zon-
ing decision by virtue of its amendments to various sections of the
Code which relate to transportation service districts. The Route 28
Primary Highway Transportation Improvement District was cre-
ated when landowners agreed to special taxes in order to finance
the cost of improving Route 28.s38 The Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors later restricted office use in some commercial and in-
dustrial districts along the Route 28 corridor. The General Assem-
bly then enacted amendments which address the creation, opera-
tion, financing, scope and termination of transportation service
districts.
For example, section 15.1-1372.3111 provides that resolutions
331. Id. § 15.1-493(C).
332. Id. § 15.1-499.1.
333. Id.
334. Id. § 15.1-491.
335. Id. § 15.1-491.2.
336. Id. § 15.1-491.2:1.
337. See id. § 15.1-491(a), (al).
338. See id. § 15.1-1372.5.
339. Id. § 15.1-1372.3.
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which propose transportation districts must state that the terms
and conditions of commercial and industrial zoning classifications
must be in force for a term of years not to exceed twenty years
without elimination, reduction, or restriction. Uses within a trans-
portation district could be changed upon the written request or ap-
proval of an owner of any property affected by a change or as re-
quired to comply with state law, or regulations pursuant to the
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act.3 40
The statute further provides that all commercial and industrial
transportation zoning classifications and zoning regulations relat-
ing thereto in districts created prior to July 1, 1989, are deemed to
be part of the ordinance creating the district.3 4' As such, the terms
and conditions shall remain in effect without limitation, reduction,
or restriction for a period of fifteen years. The Board of Supervi-
sors may reduce or restrict commercial and industrial uses if the
action is part of an overall revision to the comprehensive plan and
the changes are unanimously approved by all the members of the
district advisory board representing the properties in the transpor-
tation district.3 42 The effect of the General Assembly's amend-
ments is to restore the development rights of certain landowners in
commercial and industrial districts along the Route 28 corridor
and to restrict the powers of local government to change zoning in
transportation districts.
III. CONCLUSION
Virginia practitioners should become familiar with a number of
important cases decided by the courts over the past year. Recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia reflect the court's ef-
forts to uphold and enforce contracts and leases pursuant to the
intent of the parties. The court generally relied upon established
principles of law in reaching its decisions. Several of the cases had
strong dissents. These dissents, however, did not establish any con-
sistent division in the court's thinking.
The General Assembly was very active in the field of zoning. The
newly enacted zoning legislation strongly suggests efforts to allo-
cate the costs of growth and development between developers and
340. Id.
341. Id. at § 15.1-1372.3(C).
342. Id.
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localities. It will be interesting to see if the General Assembly will
be as active in zoning matters during the next session.
